Amid enlargement, evolving neighborhood dynamics, intensifying global competition and shifting transatlantic relations, Europe must safeguard its strategic autonomy and democratic values while redefining its role as a coherent and influential global actor.
What vision will guide a European foreign policy that leads with purpose in the decade ahead?
This session was developed in collaboration with The Financial Times.
This is a livestreamed session. Please arrive 15 minutes early as the doors will close at the scheduled time.
Europe’s leaders and business executives argued in Davos that the continent must urgently harden its strategic autonomy amid a continuing war in Ukraine and a more coercive United States. Lithuania’s President Gitanas Nausėda cast doubt on near-term peace prospects, warning Russia is “buy[ing] more time to attack Ukraine” and that even a deal would not end Moscow’s “imperialistic ambitions.” Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever said Europe faces a credibility test: with red lines crossed, it must choose between “self-respect” and becoming a “miserable slave,” adding that division is Putin’s advantage.
Croatia’s Prime Minister Andrej Plenković emphasized keeping transatlantic ties while closing European vulnerabilities through unity, defense investment, and enlargement. He argued Ukraine’s military experience is a strategic asset for Europe and cautioned against territorial concessions.
From finance, ABN AMRO CEO Marguerite Bérard urged Europe to match values with economic strength, warning that excessive risk aversion is itself risky; markets already price uncertainty, with U.S. long yields elevated despite Fed cuts. Mistral AI CEO Arthur Mensch framed technology dependence as Europe’s biggest strategic risk: without European AI and cloud capabilities, Europe could become a “colony in artificial intelligence,” vulnerable in industry, defense, and information sovereignty.
Hello, everybody, and welcome to this session on Redefining Europe's place in the world, which we couldn't really have a more kind of appropriate session for today. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has just been speaking downstairs and talked about the need for a new form of European independence. I'm Gideon Rachman, I'm chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times, and I'm delighted to have a fantastic panel to discuss this very topic. Just to moving from left to right on my my immediate left is the Prime Minister of Belgium, Bart De Wever. Then we have the CEO of ABN Amro, Marguerite Bérard. Then we have the President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nauseda. Then we have the co-founder, chief executive officer of Mistral AI, Arthur Mensch. And on the far left we have Andrej Plenkovic, the prime minister of Croatia. So, where do we start? Why don't I start with you, President Nauseda? Before we get to the man who's going to dominate attention tomorrow, Donald Trump, we shouldn't forget there is a major war going on in Europe. You know, right up against it with Belarus as your as your neighbour and Russia as your near neighbour. And yet there is talk of a peace plan. Now do you have any, real hope that this plan can be made to work for Ukraine?
I was, I am, I am and probably I will be on the skeptical side of people because I know Russia, our country knows Russia very well. And as far as Ukrainians talk diplomatic language, and we are now in the process of elaboration of this peace plan, 20 point peace plan. But on the other hand, Russian stock with missiles. Probably it's too early to conclude that Russians are ready to, take this plan and to start to negotiate. I think they want to buy more time to attack Ukraine, and first of all, to attack the critical infrastructure of Ukraine, making the life of ordinary people impossible, even in capital, in Kyiv, and then more, maybe at the later stage they will sit down and they will, talk about the peace. But I think some issues of these 20 point peace plan or some elements of them are not acceptable for Russians. And I think this is about a matter of territorial concessions from the side of Ukraine. I think Russians require the whole region of Donbas, and also the strength of Ukrainian army, 800,000 soldiers on the ground is also not acceptable for Russians. We will see what will happen. But I would like to, move away or to push away the illusion that if the peace deal will be done, I hope that it will be sooner or later. Russia will refuse to have imperialistic ambitions. I don't see any signals that it might happen because the Kremlin's regime is as it is, and even the change of Kremlin's regime probably will not mean the radical changes in the policy of Russia. Because I from time to time, I hear what the Russian opposition leaders are talking about. Actually, they are presenting the same ideas. And those ideas are, first of all, expansionist policy of Russia. They like the European Union, they are talking about enlargement, but we are talking about civilized enlargement, and they are talking about enlargement by using the force and by using the guns.
Okay. Well, very sobering. Thank you very much for that. Introductory thought, Prime Minister. Of course, Europe is under pressure from two sides, Russia. But also we have Donald Trump arriving tomorrow demanding Greenland, part of a European Union country, I noticed. Yeah. So the question the people keep asking me in the corridors, do you think Europe can, will will stay united? A lot of people saying, you know, Europe's going to fold in the end, that's what they do. Europe won't be able to push back. How confident are you that Europe can, as a von der Leyen said, stay united, proportional and respond?
It's a very good question. Actually. I wonder about this myself. We're under a lot of pressure with 27 countries, and if you're under pressure, two things can happen. If you have outside pressure, you can come together or you can explode in any possible direction. And I think Europe is at a crossroads where it has to decide. Until now, we tried to appease the new president in the white House. We were very lenient also with the tariffs. We were lenient, hoping to get his support for the Ukraine war. We are in a very bad position at the moment. We're dependent on the United States, so we chose to be lenient. But now so many red lines are being crossed that you have the choice between your self-respect. Being a happy vessel is one thing. Being a miserable slave is something else. If you, back down now, you're going to lose your dignity. And that's probably the most precious thing you can have in a democracy. It's your dignity. So we should, unite. And we should say to Donald Trump, I'm going to meet him tomorrow. The meeting was fixed before the Greenland issue, so.
I'm looking forward to it.
Oh, yeah. Yeah, I'm looking forward. The king will accompany me, on the. I'm looking at the queen, who's sitting in the front row. Our king will accompany me at the meeting, but it will have a different character than we, had planned. It will probably be the message that we have to send your crossing red lines here. We either stand together or we will stand divided. And if we are divided, there is the end of an era of 80 years of Atlanticism is really drawing to a close. And, you know, as Gramsci said, if the old is dying and the new is not yet born, you live in a time of monsters, and it's up to him to decide if he wants to be a monster, yes or no.
Very good. Before I move on to Prime Minister Plenkovic, I just wanted to ask you about the aftermath of the whole Euroclear argument, which you were absolutely in the center of. And I think you must have been reasonably happy if not with the argument with the outcome. But some people will say, well, that whole episode just told you about Europe's problems. Here's Europe. We say we're going to do this big thing. And then we all sit around arguing and then we do a little thing and everybody says, oh, look, they can't get it together.
I'm going to try to be a little bit optimistic. Otherwise it's going to be a very depressing session here. At the end of the day, we decided to, aid Ukraine with €90 billion. And that was the thing we had to do, keep Ukraine in the fight, because the United States is no longer supporting them. They're on their own. It's not looking good. Was Europe able to say, we're going to do whatever it takes to keep you in the fight? And at the end we did the way in which we did it. The discussions we had maybe are not an example of the best governance you can imagine, but at the end of the day there was a result. But of course we are in a bad position. We didn't do our homework. We stayed believing in the United West on, but the writing was already on the on the wall when Obama said, I'm the first Pacific president, the burden shift from the United States towards China. We chose to ignore it and to keep enjoying the peace dividend. We didn't rearm. We didn't strengthen ourselves. Now we're in a weak position. But I think having said that, that we made the choice to to to support Ukraine only we learned a lesson the hard way with the Euroclear and the reparation loan debate, that there is no such thing as free money. There's nothing like the Alibaba cave that opens, and you can simply take the gold and get away with it. That was an illusion that existed for a few months in the European table, but I think we managed to put an end to it for the moment.
Okay. Prime Minister Plenkovic, I'm interested in your take. Again, to quote the president of the commission, she said, Europe's response will be unflinching, united and proportional. There's a European Council meeting on Thursday night. What kinds of things will Croatia be arguing for, that Europe should respond to from these twin challenges? Russia and the United States?
Now? Yes. First of all, thank you for for being here again for 10th season in a row as the Prime Minister of Croatia. My first point is regarding what we were discussing in December in, in Brussels, I think, whatever the outcome was, pending option A, option B using the Russian central bank, frozen assets or the loan, the good outcome that we have found €90 billion to finance Ukraine for 26 and 27, both functioning of the state. The entire, I would say, blood flow of the financial system and also helping Ukraine to defend itself. This was the key political objective. How we got objective, how we got to it was basically a technique. I think the outcome which came out was a little bit more, secure when it comes to the legal certainty. And therefore, Bart has managed to convince the majority of us that his arguments were fine. When it comes to the two pressures, one coming from Russia with a brutal violation of international law and the aggression against Ukraine after other episodes in the, part of Europe, which was formerly a neighborhood. Now it's more into the enlargement basket. I mean, here, Moldova and Georgia, which do have basically frozen territories. I think that the key aspect is to remain vigorously on the side of the Ukrainians and on the side of freedom, democracy and international law. This is what we stand for. This is why we have supported so strongly Ukraine over the past four years. I think many of us will be heading to Kyiv on the 24th of February to extend further support. And, I think we should a little bit revisit what we discussed a few days ago. And that is the peace plan. Now, the Greenland has taken us the entire debate into a different direction. A bit odd, unexpected. But these are the realities of a changing global order. We are as as we have seen recently, in the situation where the international organizations, international law, global governance as we know it is changing so rapidly that we need to position ourselves. I think the only safe way for the European Union to remain an actor is to try to be as united as possible. Not necessarily. All the governments are singing the same tune. And if that is visible from someone who would like to see a little bit more divisions on the EU side, then that will be exactly the weak spot and the weak link which will be emphasized. So I guess that this meeting on Thursday night is supposed to strengthen our position on, supporting, Denmark. Obviously that is a very logical way to do it, but also maintaining sensible, reasonable, expected good transatlantic ties with the United States. I mean, for all of us, despite all the, let's say, noise in the communications channel. I mean, United States is an ally and a friend. I don't know anybody among 27 who has altered that position. So we need to talk to each other more, maybe be less abrupt in, being faced with a fait accompli propositions, but more, talking to each other and finding solutions for the global order. This is this is our position. And this is a line of Croatia that has been very clear for the last ten years.
Thank you very much. Marguerite, you run a big European bank. You're I mean, both things, I guess, are important to you. You're European. You're also a banker. How do you navigate these geopolitical waters? I was quite struck that the European Business Roundtable issued a statement saying, you know, okay, it's enough with America. We need to get tough, which is not the normal thing that you expect business people to say. So how do you see it?
You're right. I'm as my accent probably betrays me, I'm French. And at the same time, you know, I live in Amsterdam running a Dutch bank, so I would define myself as passionately European. And when, when I tried to think about what? What are European values? I would say that, you know, this is about, you know, the rule of law. This is about human dignity. This is about democracy. This is about also reason, reason and truth. And these all these values of cooperation have serviced well in the past decades, you know, and helped us build a Europe free world. Right now we feel challenges from all fronts, outside of Europe, you know, with, with walls, with authoritarian regimes and also, in fairness, within Europe, with, I would say, added polarization. Sometimes the erosion of truth in our internal debate and sometimes also political instability and fragmentation, and, and right now, looking at Europe, we sometimes feel, hey, are we herbivore in a world of carnivores? Because on all fronts, you know, we we feel right now under pressure.
Looks a bit like that.
It may feel like that. And then the answer is, if we want to defend our values, we need to be strong. And this is not only about, I would say, military or political strength. This is also about economic strengths. And this is where, you know, very, you know, humbly as, as a banker, you know, we feel we can contribute because what our banks are, the plumbing of the economy, the blood circulating in the economy, making projects possible, financing innovation, financing infrastructure and taking risks. We we manage and understand, and this is what we want to do because we want to be, you know, strong European banks for a strong Europe that sometimes also lead us to to, I would say, question collectively or risk appetite in Europe. Don't get me wrong. You know, I was at the time of the financial crisis, actually, in the public service working at the Elysée. So I got first hand experience of what goes wrong when the financial sector goes wrong. But I think we have built a very sound financial sector, and now we need to make sure that, sometimes, you know, our collective risk appetite is not preventing us from also financing the needed European transitions. Be it energy, defense, mobility, tech and digital, to name a few. Because unfortunately, being conservative in in today's world and status quo is not a very you know, it's not a risk of position. It is a very dangerous one.
Well, that leads me naturally to ask because, I think one of the reasons for American super confidence and their slight contempt for Europe, maybe slight as an understatement, is the sense that we have fallen way behind in the industries of the future, particularly, technology. And indeed, I remember being at a meeting and you passed by and somebody said, you know, there's our only hope. He's the only guy we've got. You know, I don't want to play too much on you, but, but how far behind is Europe? And what can we do about it?
Well, I think there are a few reasons to be optimistic on that front. If you look at technology is about inflection points. And whenever you have a replatforming of software, because you've invented a new technology, you can expect competition to rise again and you can expect opportunities to rise. And then the question is, is Europe ready to, use those opportunities to catch up? Because effectively, we lost the battle on cloud and we created a huge dependency to US digital services in Europe. So that's 80% of digital services being imported, from the US to Europe. And that's effectively all that amount of value that is coming back to the US. Used, and reinvested in R&D to build further leverage and further dominance. And so this is true, but yet AI is a way to build different software. It's a different kind of infrastructure that you need to build. You need a lot of energy. You need high, high density energy sites. Europe has plenty of those. You can rebuild the entire public cloud services based on AI technology. And it's actually much less costly to rebuild thanks to artificial intelligence. So suddenly the unit economics of software have changed. And the good thing about Europe is that we have opportunities. We have, again, energy high, high supply of energy. We have talented people that can build software quickly. We actually have, manufacturing, financial services companies that are worldwide competitors, world class. And those companies are willing to spend on R&D, willing to transform themselves around artificial intelligence. And what we've seen in the last year. And honestly, I think Donald Trump presidency played a role there, is that a lot of these companies and a lot of European states realize that now may be the time to partner with European technology providers to build value together, to make sure that the value created is reinvested in research and development, to further build leverage and get rid of the dependency that we have created for ourselves. And that dependency, the technological dependency is probably the biggest vector of power of of the United States. And if you talk to JD Vance, that's exactly how he staged that. So we do need to build that leverage and to make sure that the that we use our strength to not fall into what I think is the biggest risk in the coming years for Europe, which is to become a colony in artificial intelligence, in that we may be in a state, if, European technology does not achieve its goals, we may be in a state where 95% of digital services and artificial intelligence is imported from the US, and that means that our entire industry is going to run its processes on top of an infrastructure that can be turned off. If, if or if the US decides to, that also means that our defense technology and deterrence is going to rely on us technology that can be turned off. And that means deterrence is cease to be anything. And eventually that also means something for democracies, and that we don't really focus on that. We really focus on the two first points, but on the on the consumer side, if you end up with two US companies that owns access to information and can influence how people think, that means they can actually influence elections. They can influence the regimes wherever they actually are deployed. And so I think we can build leverage on the three things. So defense, economy and information sovereignty. We work with businesses, enterprises and states to make sure that we create leverage on the two. First, we can do it more. We think Europe could invest more in European technology, procure more European technology, cease to procure US technology. And and that that would propel us forward. But really, we have reasons to be optimistic. And in a way, we are ceasing to be the frog in the slowly boiling kettle, because we realized that effectively they've built leverage and they're going to use it. So now the a lot of red lines have been crossed. And, it means that actions are being taken and I think we should continue to take them.
Just a quick follow up. I mean, as you say, you run a major business. You must in the space you're in work a lot with Americans. You have to.
I mean, we do. Yeah, we do, and we export to America. And we haven't built our differentiation based on sovereign concerns. Only we've built, an approach to enterprise software and approach to creation of value in financial services manufacturing that actually exports to that we actually export to the US.
But as a businessman, you know, with responsibility to the people who invested in you, can you do the things that politically you think need to be done, which is, you know, reduce your risk, reduce your exposure to the United States?
We have in that we have reduced our dependency to, hyperscalers, for instance. That's why we moved toward infrastructure. We we decided to invest in creating our own servers, in buying our own GPUs, in operating those. And and eventually what we, what we, what we are achieving is that we are now a full stack, vertically integrated AI cloud provider that does reduce our dependency to US services, because effectively, when we started, we used, US cloud services because there was nothing, nothing else to train models on. Now, we do depend on goods, goods. The good dependency is not going to disappear anytime soon, but the good dependency is much more balanced in that, the US actually needs European goods. We need US goods. We'll find a way on digital services. This is not balanced. And this is this is a very high risk. And so that's why we decided to build that vertically integrated stack. Because we heard from the market, from public sector, from defense that this was the requirement.
Okay. Marguerite, actually, I'd just like to ask you how all of this applies to the financial sector. I mean, because people are saying, I mean, maybe this trade war will be called off and Donald Trump will change his mind, etc. but if it starts, it'll start spilling over, perhaps into, banking and into the financial markets. And in fact, do you think we're already seeing a reaction in the financial markets to the growing uncertainty?
I would say that, you know, there's one thing markets don't like is, is, you know, uncertainty. And certainly, you know, when when there is less cooperation, people start to, to, to, to really become fidgety. And I think there's something interesting that we're observing right now. And if you remember what happened last April when, when, you know, the discussions on on tariffs were in full swing, you know, what really puts some reasons back in the system was the fact that, you know, markets reacted strongly. And basically the, you know, the interest rate on on the ten year, you know, US bonds US bond started to to, you know, go through the roof and the US you know have their weaknesses. And one of these weaknesses is, you know, they have enormous amount of debts they need to finance. So, so at some point, you know, when markets and money markets become fidgety. This is also this is also having an impact. And if I look right now, it's quite interesting. Despite, you know, three cuts by the fed in, in, you know, short term interest rates, you see that the ten year yield bond is not is not, you know, falling that pace. So so right now there is uncertainty. And you see it spiking. The ten year right now is at its highest level since September. So so markets are sort of bracing for impact right now.
Interesting. President Nauseda I mean, coming back to the Russia challenge, what's your assessment of the state of the Russian economy? And do you think there is more that Europe can do to pile pressure on?
The information we receive, of course, is not very encouraging for Russian, the state of Russian economy. And I think the Russian economy is just deteriorating and have had a lot of macroeconomic problems. This balances and I think this is a matter of time when they will switch into the stage of stagflation, the stagnation and high inflation at the same time. But, you know, the the specific feature of Russia is that the politicians or dictator can ignore this macroeconomic situation just by putting all the burden to the ordinary people and just pretending to invest more into the defense and ignoring all these imbalances, at least for the for the time being. So it doesn't mean that we shouldn't put additional pressure on Russia in the form of sanctions, and European Union will do this, I am pretty sure. And we have to punish also the close ally of Russia, Belarus, which is actually our neighbor, very close neighbor, 600km common border with Lithuania. And we are just experiencing almost every day, form of attacks might it might be the illegal migration, it might be matter of balloons. The drones coming from Ukraine. And this regime is close ally of Putin and should be sanctioned, logically too. So this is the reason why I all the time I support the idea of imposing the sanctions on Belarus, because this country is a source of instability in the region. What should Europe do? Of course, Europe should take more responsibilities not only in the field of economy, but also in the field of military forces. And I see that we made quite significant progress in the last months. The much should be done in the future because we are still lagging behind by many means. First of all, we are lagging behind if we compare our military capabilities with Russian capabilities, we are obviously lagging behind. If we compare the production capacity, the Russians can produce ammunition. Military, guns and other military equipment. And Europe has not so much time in order.
That's the question I wanted to ask you is this time question because I've heard very different assessments. Some, you know, one senior former European leader said to me, you know, the Russian scare, the Russian threat is overdone. They've been fighting for for years. They haven't taken Kharkiv, which is, you know, 30 miles from their frontier. There's no way they're going to attack Europe. And then there are others, like Mark Rutter, the secretary general, who says, no, no, this is a very, very dangerous moment. And people in the Baltic states also say, you know, you could take the threat from Russia as quite imminent.
Baltic state this time. I think this is not about the Baltic states, because missiles can reach in five, ten minutes every capital of Europe. This is, by the way, the wording of Mark Rutte two so we are all affected because this time Putin wants to challenge the democracy, our rule of law and all these good things you mentioned. And I think we have to be aware and why I am talking that after the peace deal, Russia will stay aggressive. You can imagine they are producing enormous amounts of guns, ammunition, equipment. And do you think they will leave those goods idle when the peace deal is over? I don't think so. Because we know the origin of Russia. We know their ideas, messianism, ideas, first of all, and I think this is a matter of concern, big concern. And we can to deal with we are able to deal with that matter only together. So this is for me, the heartbreaking to see the conflict between the United States and Europe, because I'm a strong believer in, in, in transatlantic bond. My country is too.
Yeah. Heartbreaking indeed but and also dangerous. And Mr. Weber, I wanted to ask you about that because the Prime Minister Plenkovic said, look, in the end, we all know America's an ally and this is still our view. But listening to you earlier, you said, you know, talked about the prospect of us becoming unhappy slaves. Do you still do you share that view that we can take it for granted that the US is an ally of Europe?
Unfortunately not. I would like to confirm that they are an ally, but then they have to behave like an ally. And if you talk about the Russian threat, it's not that great if the West is united. But we are not united and Putin sees this. The economy of Russia is very weak. Their military threat is not very real unless we are divided. But it's exactly what he sees that we are divided. When we had the last meeting of the coalition of the Willing in Paris, the American delegation started their opening statement by saying, we're not here to take a side in the conflict. I found this very shocking because I grew up in the 1980s where the West stood for something, for the sovereignty of the people, for democracy, for freedom. The idea that in a conflict between a tyrant and a democracy, the United States will say, well, we're not going to take sides in a gathering of the coalition of the willing Pro-ukraine of democratic allied countries, saying, we're coming here together because one of us is threatened by Russian aggression. We have to support them. They said, we're not here to take sides. We're here to make a deal. Putin sees this. This is his strength is our division. And of course, if he if he follows the news and says, now a NATO country is threatening another NATO country with military invasion, it will not discourage him to continue his war on Ukraine. It will certainly not discourage the Chinese to choose for an imperialistic agenda. And if the Atlanticism would really die, I hope not. But if it dies, globalization will die with it. That's very clear. And we cannot stay a herbivore in that world. That's the European lesson we have to learn. We have to wake up, we have to rearm, we have to integrate our market, and we have to weaponize our market, and we have to seek new alliances. I don't think we have to annul the alliance we have, but we have to seek new ones. Mercosur was very useful. You have to do it.
Do we have to? Do we have to tilt towards China a bit?
We have to continue engaging China. China is always a mystery. They could go both ways. They could go full imperialistic. But I think China can also be engaged to evolve towards a win win situation. But of course, then you also need the United Europe to talk to them, to say, what is our win? Because for the moment it is their win and our lose in 20, in 2007, the numbers don't lie. The European economy was ten times bigger than China. Now we're equal. In 2007, we were equal with the United States. Now they're 50% in front of us. The entire difference is the tech sector. We've become totally dependent on technology that we do not own and do not control. That is not how the Chinese did it. They did it differently. We were a little bit naive and it's time to wake up. We need our own technological platforms to build the prosperity of tomorrow. If not, Trump can do with us. He can play with us. He can make us slaves because we actually are slaves then, and we will have to take for granted whatever he does. And we've been accustomed to very nice presidents like Obama, and we haven't noticed that the shift in America is not bound to one presidency. It's a structural shift. The face of America has turned to the Pacific, their backside is turned to the Atlantic. And that will not change after Trump. It's a structural thing. So it's up to us, I think, not to complain about Trump because you say you will get all the attention tomorrow. I can assure you, you already had it today. In every conversation it's Trump, Trump, Trump, Trump, Trump. Okay, that's very nice. And we can complain about Trump the way he does things, the way he tells things, the humiliation. He lays it on very thick. But that cannot exclude us or that does not, exempt you from doing your own homework. And maybe we should focus on that. And then maybe in five years we will say, thank you, Mr. Trump, for waking us up just in time to build a strong, a much stronger Europe, a united Europe. It can go either way. Either we unite or either globalization will die and we will be the victim of it.
Yeah, yeah.
Do you want to say I want to come to Prime Minister Plenkovic in a second, but a quick one.
Maybe two, two remarks on my side. I fully agree with the Prime Minister. One of the striking facts for me. And, you know, I went to university in the US. This is a country I deeply feel for. I'm struck by the weakness of US institutions at the moment. It is it is striking. We thought that this was, you know, the strongest democracy, with with strong checks and balances. You know, right now when I'm talking to American CEOs, many of them accept to say things in private that they don't say they're saying in public because they are concerned about potential returns on their companies. And I'm like, oh my God, is this the US we're talking about? So that's one sort of fact that we have to digest as well in the way we, we perceive the US right now. And the other one is and that may seem as, as a long time ago, but I think we all read, you know, the, the, the paper, the US, you know, the national strategy, that was shared and the terms in which Europe were described. I mean, it was described. It's not, you know, it's not the description of an ally or a friend. And so it is. It is. Yeah.
Well, it's a friend that needs intervention because we're apparently facing civilizational erasure, and they need to help us out of it. But, Prime Minister Plenkovic, obviously, you said, you know, the different end of Europe from from Belgium. From your point of view in Croatia, I think you were the last, enlargement, the last most recent member of the EU. Do you think enlargement is still something that the EU should be looking at as a way of strengthening itself?
Absolutely. We are certainly the last, member of the European Union, but it was already 13 years ago. We joined NATO in 2009. And that's why for us, you know, when, after the Bucharest NATO summit, at the time President Bush came to Croatia and the San Marcos square in front of the government, in Parliament, he said, no one will ever take your freedom away. For a country that had occupied territories to 27% at a certain point, which was the biggest percentage Ukraine had in 2022, that was an important message of stability and assurance of peace. That's why. That's why for us, keeping the transatlantic relationship is important. It's something that is embedded in our way of thinking, how we see democracy and the West. And I'm sure the similar logic also is, is in Lithuania. What I would like to say here, how does it look when it comes to the enlargement? I think we are at the point where we might change the optics. So far, the optics of the enlargement was every country fulfilling the criteria, whether it's political, economic, rule of law, on its own merits. Now, if the part of the deal for the peace deal in Ukraine will be a faster pace for Ukraine towards the European Union, that may completely alter the approach and it will be an entirely geopolitical approach to the enlargement, which then, opens the space for the countries of Southeast Europe, our neighbors, the Western Balkan countries. And for us, it is strategically important that while strongly supporting Ukrainian efforts, we would like to see that the countries also in our neighbourhood, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, take this chance and be looked at in a more favorable way than it was so far. So this debate will be, I would say, struck by the absorption capacity of the European Union, something we rarely talk about. But these are two elements which are critical. One is how we actually take the decisions, because making decisions at six, nine, 12, 15, I don't know, 25, 27 or 28. And now back to 27. It's one thing making them at, let's say, 35, 36, it's even a little bit more complex. And then the budgetary implications, because a number of us are still so-called friends of cohesion, meaning that we are on the recipient side when it comes to the distribution of power of the EU budget. That means we pay less as a contribution than we would actually receive in order to get to the level playing field. That is the logic of the European solidarity through cohesion and agricultural budgetary policies. So with Ukrainian membership, things will change the countries.
Do you think you'll become a net contributor?
I don't know, there aren't really that precise calculations yet, but it will certainly have a big impact on everyone. And that is something that will be taken into account. So I think that in parallel with the, ongoing negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework, 2834 we should take a fresh look on what will happen with the enlargement of the union. I think this is the global moment where the European Union should be stronger, both in terms of industry, in terms of competitiveness, in terms of the AI, and most of all, more defense and security. And in that context, enlargement should not be neglected. I think we should fill in the sort of gray holes that are there and that are literally within the body of the European Union, that is the South east Europe today. And that's why our policy was always in favor of enlargement. But I think we need a serious open debate and a fresh look on what is going to happen in the few years ahead of us.
Okay. Well, we've had a great discussion. There's about six minutes left. I'm sorry, I meant to leave at least ten for questions, but, you know, does anybody want to ask a question if, there are microphones around? Is there a hand? Do I see a hand? Yeah, in the front row here. One one second.
Hi, everybody. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya of Democratic Forces of Belarus. My question is, I hear the voices that, we need to lift sanctions from Russia or Belarus or engage with the dictators. I really appreciate the Polish Lithuanian President Nauseda and his strong position. What, are the opinions? You know, I'm really skeptical about this, but will it help?
Okay, perhaps for you.
The question.
So the leader of the Belarusian opposition saying she's worried.
People that we should engage with dictators or lift sanctions from Russia or Belarusian regime.
Do you think? Okay. I mean, just to add a nuance to that, some people say, look, the Americans are talking to the Russians. Maybe the Europeans should talk to the Russians as well. What do you think?
Americans are talking with Belarusians? Yeah, they are talking with Belarusians, releasing Belorussia, releasing some political prisoners at the same time throws new prisoners, into the prisons. But the question was about, yes, about our unity regarding this issue, too, because there are some discussions about how hard we should approach Belarus, how, consistent and decisive we have to be in front of Belarus. And I think we have to apply the same policies as against Russia, because, as I mentioned, and not only that, Belarus is, deploying the organic systems. Belarus is deploying a tactical nuclear weapons building, or at least they are the plans to build new nuclear reactors. Additionally, by violating all the safety rules and standards. So this is really the matter of concern, especially taking into account that the current regime has consolidated itself. This is a problem not for next 1 or 2 years. It might be the problem for next ten years.
Prime Minister, I saw you wanted to say something.
Well, negotiate with Putin, I think is not a very good idea, because, as the Americans said, if you want to speak, speak softly, but carry a big stick. We don't have a big stick. We can only speak softly. And that is for the moment our. That's our problem with soft speech. You're not going to convince Belarus. You're not going to convince Putin. You're the real elected leader of Belarus. And if you talk about enlargement, this is our power. It's Europe wants to be people want to join the European Union. Nobody wants to join China. Nobody, no neighbor of the United States says, we want to join the United States. Nobody wants to. They want to join the European Union. Just because we have respect. We have the rule of law. We do speak softly, but it is an important debate because the enlargement will, of course, test the observation of the, of the United of, of, of, of, the United States of Europe. I wanted.
To say that.
But.
Give it a couple of years.
Just at the moment where we need deep integration to get the big stick, the enlargement debates is contradictory to that. Maybe we should do both create Europe's at different speeds, because I do want to enlarge, and I do hope that one day we can, have you join as the real leader of Belarus in the European family and speak softly amongst ourselves. Would be great.
Actually. I'll just take it and then I'll come to you. There's a question over there. Just one more.
Sorry. I take the floor from the Prime Minister. My name is Michael Moran. I represent French speaking Ukraine. We vice president for MSP company. We are the biggest producer of poultry in in Europe. First of all, from Ukraine.
Keep it short because we only got two minutes.
Ukrainians, we would like to thank you for all these words of support and for your clear standing for Ukraine, for independence and for your clear understanding where what is the good and what is what is bad. And this is very important. I will be very short because I wanted to I wanted to ask about the question about our integration boosting integration to you. And it's very great that you you mentioned it first. But one point I would like to mention in this, in this, that maybe what do you think? Maybe Europe needs more clarity, more strategy regarding how you will perceive how you see Ukrainian potential to strengthen strategic autonomy of.
Okay, I'm going to have to cut you off there. You won't get an answer. Prime Minister Plenkovic, why don't you answer that? Because you wanted to add to some of the other.
Stuff.
If I may just relate a little bit to please. Yeah, because she mentioned the issue of the sanctions. I think we need to be very clear on what, Kremlin is doing. The dialogue between the United States and Russia on Ukraine is the way to, first of all, restore the relations between Moscow and Washington. Secondly, to be in the position to get gradually rid of various restrictive measures or sanctions regime, whether it's European or American or somebody else's or UK's. And third, seek the full rehabilitation of the international scene. These are the three steps which are crystal clear. Everything that has been happening over the last few months in the context of.
Thing is even probably more complicated than Gaetano suggested. We didn't see the reflection on the political line, nor the political context, nor the strengthening of the opposition, nor weakening of the regime. No change of the course. This is the specificity that we are dealing, and that's where the problem is. That's why the United States are in this context with the new second Trump administration in the position to talk, because they talk actually differently than what the rest of us talk in the context of the European Union. They have given themselves a maneuvering space when it comes to, to the question of, of Ukraine. Ukraine actually has a lot to give to Europe when it comes to security and defense. Basically, Ukrainian military today is the only one that has been in such a test of war and defense that nobody else has done that on such a large scale. We are a small country. We had a problem 30 years ago, but it's almost uncomparable to what Ukraine has endured, suffered and actually resisted so strongly in order to diminish the percentage of the currently occupied territories than illegally annexed from 27 to 19.5, which I suggested to President Zelensky. Never give a drop of an ink to something that may be giving away territories.
Dura may I very shortly.
, where I'm afraid I think we're out of time and they're going to throw us out of the room. But, just two sentences and then I'll wrap.
It up. I am in favor of setting very clear date of the membership for Ukraine and European Union, not as a legally binding, but as a political ambition. And I represent this idea in all the European Council meetings, and I hope that there will be more colleagues supporting this idea. This would be a great contribution to the strategic autonomy you mentioned. Two.
Okay. That's a very good thought and a concrete proposal on which to end this session. So thank you very much to the panel and thanks to the audience.